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Francisco Zamora López 3 
Abstract  
Spain’s total fertility rate has more than halved since 1975, when it was 2.8, to the 
present 1.3 (the lowest rate on record, 1.2, was reached in 1995). At the same time, the 
mean age at first childbirth has grown continually, seriously hindering any sustained 
recovery of fertility. Cohort fertility, in turn, has declined uninterruptedly since the 
1941 cohort, and according to all estimates, this will drop to 1.6 for women born in the 
1960s. A downturn in nuptiality, which has not been offset by a rise in consensual 
unions, along with the prevalence of contraceptives and abortion, have contributed 
substantially to falling fertility. Underlying this decrease is the profound cultural, social, 
and economic change that has raised the perceived costs of leaving the parental home 
and having children. The lack of any explicit family policy or transfers to compensate 
for such costs has reinforced that perception. 
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2 Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
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1. Introduction  
Spain, with a population of 44.11 million on 1 January 2005, has the typical 
characteristics of a western low-fertility country: long life expectancy (77.2 for men and 
83.8 for women in 2004), low fertility (1.3 children per woman in 2004) and a sizeable 
foreign population (3.73 million in 2005, or 8.5% of the total). And yet, these figures do 
not reflect what truly characterizes the Spanish population: the swift and profound 
changes taking place in the last 50 years that have made the country a model of 
relatively recent and speedy demographic transformation. In terms of the above 
indicators, life expectancy at birth for males has risen by 17.4 years (from 59.8 years in 
1950) and for females by 19.5 years (from 64.3 years in 1950). The period fertility rate 
plummeted from 2.5 children per woman in 1950 to 1.2 in 1995, and the token presence 
– 59,483, just 0.2% of the population – of foreigners in 1953 (the first year for which 
data on foreigners residing in Spain are available) has soared in the interim to nearly 63 
times the 1953 number. Consequently, one of the most representative characteristics of 
recent Spanish demographics has been the conversion from a country of emigration to 
one of immigration, and from a net outflow of 1.2 million people in the 1950s and 
1960s to the net inflow of 1.7 million in the 1990s4. This rapid change in the various 
demographic indicators is a reflection on the modernization undergone by Spanish 
society in the last few decades and may help to understand its sometimes contradictory 
behavior. 
 
 
2. Fertility trends  
Fertility rates tumbled to record lows in the last few decades of the 20th century in some 
developed countries. In Spain, the lowest rates were reached in the 1990s, when total 
fertility rate values dipped below 1.2 between 1995 and 1998. A steady downward trend 
– with certain minor fluctuations – had been observed since the last half of the 1970s, 
when the rate was 2.78 (Table 1).  
                                                          
4 In Spain, ‘foreigner’ is understood to mean a person’s nationality, not his/her place of birth. When foreign 
nationals obtain Spanish citizenship – either by marriage or establishment in the country – they become 
Spaniards. No statistics have been published on the number of naturalized foreigners, nor do the National or 
Municipal Census records distinguish between Spaniards by birth and naturalized Spaniards.  
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Table 1: Total fertility rates by birth order and mean age at childbearing,
   Spain, 1975 - 2005  
 
Mean age at childbearing Year 
 
Order 1 
 
Order 2 
 
Order 3 
 
Order 4 
and higher 
Total 
 1st birth All births 
1975 1.008 0.837 0.481 0.454 2.780 25.3 28.8 
1980 0.897 0.693 0.343 0.277 2.210 25.1 28.2 
1985 0.725 0.529 0.227 0.156 1.637 25.8 28.5 
1990 0.672 0.480 0.151 0.074 1.377 26.8 28.9 
1995 0.600 0.436 0.110 0.041 1.187 28.4 29.8 
2000 0.664 0.448 0.101 0.032 1.244 29.0 30.7 
2002 0.694 0.446 0.100 0.031 1.272 29.2 30.8 
2003 0.704 0.448 0.099 0.030 1.282 29.2 30.8 
2004 0.717 0.452 0.099 0.030 1.298 29.3 30.9 
2005 0.736 0.459 0.098 0.031 1.323 29.3 30.8 
 
* Since 2002 rates are calculated on population from Padron Municipal de Habitantes. 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
 
 
Spanish fertility patterns, like the tendencies recorded earlier in other Western 
European countries, exhibit characteristics typical of the Second Demographic 
Transition. The tardy onset in Spain of trends previously recorded in neighboring 
European countries is nothing new; however, since the secular decline that began in the 
late 19th century elsewhere, this first became apparent in 1920-1930 in Spain (Leasure 
1963; Livi-Bacci 1968; Coale and Watkins 1986; Hicks and Martínez Aguado 1987). 
The drop goes hand-in-hand with profound structural change. Between 1975 and 
1995 all rates, regardless of the birth order, declined significantly although there are 
substantial differences between them: while first and second-order birth rates dropped 
by 40% and 47%, respectively, the figures for third order births tumbled by nearly 80% 
and higher than third order by 90%.  Between 1995 and 2005 two trends can be 
observed: while the third and higher order birth rates continued to decline, the first and 
second order rates recovered, the former (27%) substantially more than the latter, which 
only grew by 5% over that ten-year period. This means that while in 1975, births higher 
than second order accounted for around one-third of total fertility; by 1995 that figure 
dropped to 12% and presently stands at 10%. Consequently, third children are 
increasingly uncommon in Spain and fourth or over are virtually non-existent, 
accounting for a mere 2% of total fertility. 
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The contribution of the highest orders to fertility is closely related to the age at 
first birth, for postponing that event reduces the possibility of higher-order births 
(Delgado et al. 2006). Since the 1970s and early 1980s, the mean age at first birth has 
risen in Spain by four years (25.3 in 1975 to 29.3 in 2004) and by 2.1 years for age at 
childbearing (28.8 in 1975 to 30.9 in 2004). Yet, postponement of the childbearing 
calendar occurred most swiftly in the 1990s, with age at first childbirth increasing by 
2.2 years in that decade alone. Moreover, this has been a consistent trend, with mothers’ 
age at first birth rising even in the years when fertility rates – for first-order births 
almost exclusively – turned slightly upward. Furthermore, the gap between the average 
age at first childbirth and age at childbearing has been steadily closing; an indication 
that the period devoted to reproduction has narrowed.  
Although the age at childbirth dropped somewhat between 1975 and 1980 –mainly 
due to an increase in teenage fertility – from the latter year onward childbearing has 
been continually postponed. While in 1975 fertility was highest at the age of 24 for 
first-order births and at 26 for all orders, by 1990 the ages had risen to 26 and 28 and in 
2004 to 30 and 32, respectively (Figure 1, a and b). The shape of the curves, eloquent 
proof of the persistent shift of motherhood toward later and later ages, also shows that 
the rise in fertility observed for certain ages in 2004 with respect to 1990 involves 
women from the ages of 28 and over for first-order births and from 31 and over for the 
total. From the age of 35, however, the slope of the curve is much steeper, particularly 
for the total of all birth orders. This means that the postponement of fertility early in life 
is very difficult to compensate, for while first-order births can be readily recovered, the 
recovery of successive childbearing is much less likely, and the resulting fertility rate is 
ultimately affected.  
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Figure 1: Age-specific fertility rates by order in Spain, 1975-2004. 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
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The slight upturn in fertility rates since 1999 is due, in strictly demographic terms, 
to two effects: the small increase in the first-order rate among Spanish women and the 
contribution of foreign women. The contribution of foreign women is more 
conspicuous in absolute than in relative terms, accounting for 3.3% of newborns in 
1996, but only 1.4% of that year’s fertility, while in 2004 the figures were 13.8% and 
3.5%, respectively. The increase since 1996 – first year for which data differentiated by 
nationality are available – is considerable, but less in terms of the fertility rate than of 
number of births, as a result of larger foreign population inflows. Another relevant 
observation is that foreign women’s fertility are high soon after their arrival and fall 
with the duration of their stay in Spain, eventually converging to native population 
patterns. Moreover, it would hardly be reasonable to expect foreign women to 
contribute to a rise in fertility of any consequence, for they would either have to sustain 
unrealistic rates or their flows would have to reach volumes that neither Spanish society 
nor its labor-market could assimilate (Delgado and Zamora López 2004 and 2006). In 
other words, although the foreign population is helping to raise population numbers and 
even out the volume of births in Spain, which has recently become an immigration host, 
its contribution to fertility is very modest. 
When childbearing is postponed, period total fertility rates have relatively low 
values (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). To the extent that TCFRs are available, these 
provide a picture of long-term fertility trends unaffected by changes in the timing of 
births. For this reason, data should be analyzed longitudinally to determine whether and 
to what extent generations will be replaced.  
Fertility trends among Spanish cohorts born in the 20th century fall into three 
stages. The first covers the generations born from 1901 to 1916, with a steep and steady 
decline in the fertility rate, from 3.3 to 2.5 children per woman. The second stage 
includes the generations born between 1917 and 1940, with a fluctuating pattern: 
relative stability, hovering at around 2.5 for the 1916-1926 cohorts, was followed by a 
rise that peaked at 2.7 for the 1931-1933 cohorts. Such growth was due practically 
solely to increased nuptiality, since marital fertility had been dropping steadily, with 
some very slight fluctuation in certain years (Fernández Cordón 1986). The third stage 
began with the cohorts born after 1940, whose fertility exhibited a visible and persistent 
decline.  
If each cohort’s fertility rate is plotted in the year in which the respective cohort 
reached the mean age at childbearing (Figure 2), it can then be compared to the period 
rate for that year. The cohorts prior to 1941 had their children in the years before the 
1970s, when the period fertility rate was at its highest, reaching three children per 
woman. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, cohort fertility peaked at 2.7: the explanation, as 
the age at motherhood shows, was that the earlier timing of childbearing raised the 
period rate over the cohort rate.  
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Figure 2: Period and cohort total fertility rates, lagged by the mean age at 
  childbearing 
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Source: Data from Fernández Cordón (1986), Frejka and Sardon (2004) and Delgado et al. (2006). 
 
 
Fertility decreased systematically among the cohorts subsequent to 1941, from 2.6 
for women born in that year to 1.6 for those born in 1965, the last cohort considered: 
i.e., a decline of one birth in 24 cohorts. Based on their age at childbearing, the 1941-55 
cohorts had their children in the 1970s and early 1980s, but their lower fertility was 
greatly attenuated and therefore not reflected in the period rates because age at 
motherhood had not yet begun to climb and in fact had dipped slightly. Consequently, 
the shift to earlier motherhood, as recorded in Spain in the 1970s, had inflated the 
period rates with respect to cohort rates (Delgado 2003). At this time, however, the 
opposite is true: the rates for the cohorts presently of childbearing age are expected to 
reach values higher than the 1.2 period rate (Bongaarts 2001, Frejka and Sardon 2004).  
As mentioned above, the postponement of childbearing is conditioning the 
ultimate intensity of fertility due to the decline in the proportion of second or higher 
order births, as well as to the growing ranks of childless women. In Spain, where data 
have been collected by birth order since 1975, behavior in that respect can be observed 
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for the cohorts born from 1960 onward only. Such a relatively recent point of departure 
does not provide for full coverage of any of the respective cohorts' reproductive lives. 
Although with truncated data, Figure 3 shows the full dimension of the process of 
delayed maternity recorded for the successive cohorts. The first-order fertility curves 
show that, with the sole exception of 1980, the rates for women up to the age of 26 are 
higher in the 1960 cohort than in any subsequent group. After that age, although fertility 
is higher in each cohort than in the one preceding it, such heightened intensity is 
attained at increasingly later ages. As a result, the recovery of postponed fertility 
becomes increasingly elusive, for even the desire for a first pregnancy runs a greater 
risk of non-consummation due to age-related sterility. 
Second-order fertility declines systematically up to the age of 31 in all cohorts 
subsequent to 1960, whereas after that age, intensity is greater in the 1965 than in the 
1960 cohort, and the tendency observed for the 1970 cohort suggests a similar outcome.   
However, as Figures 4a and 4b show, the cumulative progression rate to first birth 
declines for all cohorts after 1960, regardless of the age considered. This evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the delay in first childbirth is not fully offset by higher 
intensities at later ages. Hence, according to cumulative fertility data, 85.6% of the 
women born in 1960 had been mothers by age 35, while the figure for the 1965 cohort 
dips to 80.5%. The figures for the age of 32, in turn – chosen instead of age 35 to be 
able to draw on data for three successive cohorts – show that 80.3% of the women in 
the 1960 cohort were mothers. By contrast, only 72.4% and 60.4%, respectively, of 
those born in 1965 and 1970 had children by that age: i.e., there is a 20-point difference 
between the first and last cohorts. For second births, the cumulative progression rate 
depicts a similar situation. By the age of 32, nearly half (48.5%) of the women born in 
1960 had been mothers for the second time, while for the 1965 and 1970 cohorts the 
figures drop to 37.4% and 27.2%, respectively.  
In other words, for first births, the absolute differences between the 1960 and 
subsequent cohorts in terms of the cumulative progression rate grow with each 
successive cohort. This trend, moreover, is consistently observed, regardless of the age 
chosen for analysis, even up to as late as 35, the beginning of the final stage of 
women’s reproductive years (Figure 5.a). Similar results are found for the absolute 
differences in second births between reference and subsequent cohorts expressed as the 
cumulative progression rate (Figure 5.b). Nonetheless, certain differences can be 
observed:  
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Figure 3: Age-specific fertility rates, first and second births, birth cohorts 
  1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980, Spain.  
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Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen, Paris. 
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Figure 4:  Cumulative progression rate to first and second births, birth 
  cohorts 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980, Spain. 
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Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen, Paris.  
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The sharpest decline between the percentages for the 1960 and the 1965 cohorts is 
observed at relatively early ages. Nonetheless, the narrowing of the gap later in life, to 
only 5 points by the age of 35, is an indication that postponed childbearing was 
subsequently offset, but only in part. In the case of the second child, however, recovery 
is less complete, with nearly an eight-point difference in the proportion of women with 
two children.  
The first childbirth differences observed between the 1970 and the reference 
cohorts for women in their 20s are even more sizeable (28 points at the age of 27). 
Although these differences tend to taper later in life, there is still a 20-point gap at the 
age of 32. This deficit would appear to be very difficult, if not impossible, to surmount 
to regain not the 1960, but even the 1965 values. It may be deduced from the shape of 
the curve that to attain the same levels as the 1965 cohort, first fertility would have to 
rise suddenly and very steeply. More specifically, a gain of one third of the total fertility 
accumulated between the ages of 15 and 32 would have to be forthcoming in just three 
years. The differences for second-order childbirth with respect to the reference cohort 
are smaller in the early ages, but by the age of 32 are very similar to the first-order 
differences. 
These data suggest that, due to the delay in the age at first childbirth, the most 
recent cohorts will not be able to make up for the deficit recorded at younger ages. As a 
result, they will have a lower cohort fertility rate than the 1960 cohort.  
Retrospective data from the 1999 Fertility Survey provide insight into parities 
higher than two for Spanish cohorts. As Figure 6 shows, childlessness among women in 
their latter reproductive years, i.e., 35-year-olds, is nearly four points higher in the 
1954-1958 and 5.1 points higher in the 1959-1963 cohorts than in the reference group 
(1949-1953). In both groups, increases are recorded in the proportion of women with 
single children (5.8 and 12.1), while the proportion with two children is very similar to 
the reference cohort figure and a steep decline is observed for women having three or 
four.  
Childbearing patterns of women differ by educational background. For instance, 
the proportion of women at age 35 who had borne children in the reference cohort 
(1949-1953) was 93.9% for those with an elementary school background, 89.9% for 
those with a secondary school education and 84.3% for those with a higher education 
(Table 2). The figures for the cohorts born ten years later (1959-1963) are: 92.2%, 
82.5%, and 75.7%, respectively. In other words, not only are there substantial 
differences by educational background within a given cohort, but the behavioral change 
from one cohort to another is much more striking among women with a higher 
education. 
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Figure 5:  Cumulative absolute change in first and second births progression 
  rate by age, bith cohorts 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980, Spain 
  (benchmark cohort 1960). 
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Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen, Paris.  
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Figure 6:  Changes in parity distribution of women at age 35, Spain, 1999 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Fecundidad 1999.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Timing of motherhood, measured by the proportion of women 
  with children at specific ages by educational attainment,  
  Spain, 1999 
 
 25   30  35 (N) Birth 
cohort 
Age in 
1999 ELEM. SEC. HIGH ELEM. SEC. HIGH ELEM. SEC. HIGH sample 
1949-53 45-49 70.3 54.4 44.4 90.4 84.5 72.1 93.9 89.9 84.3 1,027 
1954-58 40-44 71.9 57.7 34.2 87.2 82.4 62.5 91.7 90.4 72.0 1,231 
1959-63 35-39 65.9 38.4 15.6 87.3 65.8 49.5 92.2 82.5 75.7 1,365 
1964-68 30-34 53.3 29.7 8.3 81.3 61.8 37.7    1,407 
1969-73 25-29 40.6 14.0 1.8       1,147 
 
ELEM = Elementary 
SEC = Secondary 
HIGH = University 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Fecundidad 1999.  
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In Spain, the preference has been for children to be born within marital union. As 
the 1999 Fertility Survey shows, around 90% of first children were born to married 
parents, a figure that rises to 96% for second and subsequent children (Zamora López 
2006). This behavior is changing to some extent, and although the figures still differ 
substantially from the data for some European countries – in Scandinavia, for instance – 
the percentage of extramarital children in Spain rose from 2% in 1975 to 25% in 2004. 
This may be the outcome of relatively recent legislation – equal status for children born 
in and out of wedlock was not established until the 1978 Constitution was ratified – and 
social change, with a growing acceptance of consensual unions and therefore 
acceptance of the children born to these couples. Moreover, the evolution of births out 
of wedlock reflects not only new behavioral patterns, but also the impact of the 
composition of the population by nationality. Although a clear upward swing was 
recorded in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, the proportion fluctuated very little during 
this period: between 9% and 11%. It was not until the latter half of the 1990s – 
concurring with the intensification of immigration flows – that the percentage began to 
rise at a faster pace. One revealing fact in this regard is that in 2004 the proportion of 
children born to unwed Spanish mothers was 22%, to unmarried foreign women as a 
whole 42%, and to Columbian and Ecuadorian women, around 65%. Consequently, the 
growing weight of South American women in the foreign community is largely 
responsible for the rise in births out of wedlock, because in these cultures cohabitation 
or ‘paperless partnerships’ are traditional patterns of behavior reaching back into 
history (Quilodrán 1999) rather than an outcome of changing values.   
A comparison of the intended family size of two children, which Spanish women 
say they would like to have, according to the data from the latest (1999) Fertility 
Survey, to the number of children they actually do have according to the same survey, 
vary with age (Table 3). For women between the ages of 40 and 44 and 45 and 49, the 
difference is estimated to be 0.40 and 0.26 children, respectively.  
One interesting finding is that the number of children wanted has declined steadily, 
cohort after cohort, regardless of the woman’s age when the question is posed; and this 
difference is greatest among the youngest cohorts. For instance, women in their 20s in 
1999 claimed to want from 0.67 to 0.57 fewer children than the cohorts who were that 
age in 1985. Moreover, since the number of children born has fallen in close parallel 
with the number wanted, the difference between the two parameters has remained 
relatively stable. In addition, the four groups of generations interviewed in both 1985 
and 1995 claimed in the latter year to want fewer children than they had said they 
wanted ten years earlier. Does this mean that Spanish women are truly lowering their 
sights in terms of family size, or are they accommodating preference to circumstances, 
in an exercise clearly intended to avoid a dissonance between an ideal and the reality? 
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Table 3:  Average number of children wanted and children already 
  born among women aged 15-49, Spain, 1985-1999  
 
a) ENCUESTA DE FECUNDIDAD 1999             
    Age group (at interview) 
  Total 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
    Birth cohort 
  Total 1979-83 1974-78 1969-73 1964-68 1959-63 1954-58 1949-53 
a) Average number of 
children wanted 2.08 1.69 1.80 1.88 2.05 2.25 2.40 2.62 
b) Average number of 
children already 
born 1.07 0.02 0.06 0.41 1.23 1.74 2.00 2.36 
c) Differences between 
"a" and "b" 1.00 1.67 1.73 1.46 0.80 0.50 0.40 0.26 
(N) sample 7,749 630 953 1,148 1,400 1,371 1,229 1,018 
b) ENCUESTA DE FECUNDIDAD Y FAMILIA 1995 (FFS)          
    Age group (at interview) 
  Total 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
    Birth cohort 
  Total 1975-77 1970-75 1965-70 1960-65 1955-60 1950-55 1945-50 
a) Average number of 
children wanted 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.30 2.60 2.50 
b) Average number of 
children already 
born 1.3 0.00 0.20 0.70 1.40 1.90 2.10 2.20 
c) Differences between 
"a" and "b" 0.90 2.20 2.00 1.50 0.80 0.40 0.50 0.30 
(N) sample 3,965 323 672 733 651 558 594 433 
c) ENCUESTA DE FECUNDIDAD 1985             
    Age group (at interview) 
  Total 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
    Birth cohort 
  Total 1965-67 1960-65 1945-50 1950-55 1945-50 1940-45 1935-40 
a) Average number of 
children wanted 2.62 2.52 2.47 2.45 2.56 2.73 2.80 2.93 
b) Average number of 
children already 
born 1.56 0.08 0.33 1.10 1.85 2.24 2.56 2.75 
c) Differences between 
"a" and "b" 1.06 2.44 2.14 1.35 0.71 0.49 0.24 0.18 
(N) sample 8,782 664 1,739 1,415 1,306 1,323 1,198 1,137 
 
For Encuesta de Fecundidad 1999 the reference date is 1 January 1999 
Source:  For 1999: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Fecundidad 1999. 
  For 1985: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (1987) 
  For 1995: Delgado y Castro Martín (1998). 
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Further to the results of the 1999 survey, the discrepancy between the number of 
children wanted, and the actual number had is largely attributed by respondents to 
‘insufficient economic resources’. Around one-third of the women over 35 who had at 
least one child had fewer than they wanted and one of the reasons most frequently cited 
to explain this difference was the paucity of financial resources; and the lower the 
educational level, the more frequent was this explanation (Delgado 2006). The stress 
and difficulties entailed in raising children are other considerations that ranked high 
among the reasons cited. 
 
 
3. Proximate determinants of fertility  
Marriage patterns, cohabitation, divorce, separation  
According to the latest data available, in 2004 there were 216,149 couples  who married 
in Spain, i.e., 55,200 fewer than the 271,347 recorded at the 20th century peak reached 
in 1975. In this same period, the total female first marriage rate dropped from 1.05 to 
0.56, but several stages can be distinguished: an initial steep decline between 1975 and 
1982 preceded periods marked by fluctuations, although defining an overall downward 
trend (Figure 7). What these data actually reveal is a change from a model – in effect 
since the 1960s – characterized by high intensity (with values of close to or higher than 
1), which collapsed after the second half of the 1970s, giving way to another model 
whose distinguishing feature was low intensity. From a more general standpoint, the 
steep decline observed in the number of marriages at the end of the 1970s was followed, 
beginning in 1996, by a slight upturn in number but not in the total female first 
marriage rate, which in fact declined after 2000. 
This rise in the number of marriages must, however, be interpreted in the context 
of the recent increase in Spain’s foreign population. The marriages in which at least one 
of the spouses was foreign climbed from fewer than 10,000 in 1996 to over 30,000 in 
2004, i.e., nearly 14% of all marriages in Spain that year. In other words, the number of 
marriages in Spain would not have increased to the same extent without the foreign 
population’s contribution. Indeed, as Figure 7 shows, it would not have increased at all 
since 2001, since marriages between two Spaniards have consistently slid since that 
year. Consequently, the figures should not be interpreted to mean a recovery stricto 
sensu of Spanish nuptiality, because the driving force of this increase has been the 
foreign population. Yet a sustained increase in nuptiality in Spain would appear to be 
unlikely if it is to come on the back of the foreign population, inasmuch as immigration 
flows are expected not to intensify but to gradually wane due to more restrictive 
immigration policies.  
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Figure 7: Number of  marriages with and without foreign spouses and total 
  female first marriage rate, Spain, 1975-2004 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
 
 
The other major change affecting nuptiality in Spain is the steady rise in the mean 
age at marriage, regardless of the order. Close to a four-year increase was recorded in 
this parameter from 1990 to 2004 for all marriages as a whole (4.01 years for women 
and 4.10 for men); in 2004 the mean age was over 30 for women and 33 for men 
(Figure 8). This rise may be attributed to the growing proportion of second or higher-
order marriages (for women, from 3.26% of all marriages in 1990 to 7.76% in 2004 and 
for men, from 4.91% to 8.98%). However, it is also associated with the 3.57-year 
(women) and 3.43-year (men) “postponement” of the mean age at first marriage 
between 1990 and 2004, which in the latter year stood at 29.17 for women and 31.24 
for men. 
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Figure 8: Mean age at marriage by sex, Spain, 1990-2004 
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According to the retrospective survey data in Figure 9, the cumulative proportion 
of women who had been married at least once declines with each successive cohort. 
This development is visible at all ages, except for the 1954-1958 and 1959-1963 
cohorts, who tended to marry prior to the age of 20. Barring such teenage exceptions, in 
each cohort a smaller proportion of women tends to marry before the age of 30 than in 
the preceding group. Even at relatively late ages (30-34 for the youngest and 45-49 for 
the oldest), the proportion of married women declines from one cohort to the next in all 
four – 1949-1953, 1954-1958, 1959-1963, and 1964-1968. This suggests either a 
growing rejection of marriage or a substantial delay in the age at marriage. Regardless 
of the underlying reason, however, the possibility of recovering nuptiality in the most 
recent cohorts is increasingly difficult, for it narrows as women grow older. In short, the 
proportion of definitively unmarried women is increasing, where that term is 
understood to mean the proportion of single 50-year old women. And for the time being 
at least, there is no sign of a trend reversal.  
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Figure 9: Cumulative proportion of women entering first marriage by age 
and birth cohort, Spain, 1999 
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As with fertility, marriage patterns are observed to differ with women’s 
educational level: by the age of 30, 93.9% of the women in the cohort 1949-1953 with 
an elementary school background, 89.1% with secondary school training, and 80.5% 
with a higher education had married. The figures for cohorts born 15 years later (1964-
1968) were 85.4%, 74.3% and 60.6%, respectively. Here again, the differences within 
the cohort as well as the inter-generational changes were more drastic in women with 
higher educational levels. 
Nuptiality was tightly linked to changes in fertility rates in Spain. As noted earlier, 
the larger cohort fertility rate among the generations prior to 1941 can be attributed to 
nuptiality. To verify its effect on current period rates, the total fertility was broken 
down into the marital and non-marital rates and simulations were run in which each of 
the elements in the equation was successively varied while all the others remained 
constant. The results of this analysis could then be used to estimate the impact of each 
of the factors on total fertility rate trends in different stages. Specifically, 12 points of 
the 52% decline in the total fertility rate between 1975 and 1991 can be attributed to the 
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influence of nuptiality. Even more relevant is the pattern observed in 1991-1996, when 
the decline in the proportion of married women would have caused a 23% drop, which 
was not reflected in the actual figures because an increase in marital fertility countered 
the impact of that decline (Delgado 2000). More recent data show that the trend 
persists, for the close to 6% increase in fertility from 1996 to 2001 would have been in 
the order of 15%, had it not been for the slump in the proportion of married women of 
fertile age. Indeed, while marital and non-marital fertility continued to climb in the 
early 1990s, this did not suffice to fully offset the decline in nuptiality.   
The parallel between mean age at first marriage and age at first childbirth (29.2 
and 29.3, respectively, in 2004) patterns is fairly significant, particularly in a population 
in which the majority feels that childbearing should ideally take place within a marital 
relationship, despite the increase in the proportion of children born to unmarried 
mothers, as discussed above. In the context of a population marrying at older ages, this 
increase in the proportion of extramarital children may be explained by a number of 
factors: 
 
• The scant difference between the mean ages at first marriage and first motherhood 
is suggestive of ‘premarital births’, i.e., children conceived and born out of 
wedlock but that in all likelihood induced subsequent marriage in many couples 
who may not have taken that step otherwise. 
• Since foreign women’s contribution to extramarital births (23.30% in 2004) is 
higher than their contribution to births in general (13.78%), this proportion is 
growing.  
• The small proportion of unmarried couples in Spain (between 3% and 6% in 2001, 
according to Eurostat and the Spanish National Statistics Institute, respectively) is 
not consistent with what might be expected in light of such a high proportion of 
extramarital births. This would confirm the hypothesis that such women marry 
soon after the birth of their children, refuting any hypothetical rejection of marriage 
as an institution, at least among couples who decide to be parents. 
 
The paucity of consensual unions identified by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
(2006a) in its 2001 census, 563,785, i.e., 6% of all couples on record in Spain and 2.5 
times more than in the 1991 census, according to the Institute itself (2005), contrasts 
with the 3% reported by Eurostat (2001) in its 1998 European Community Household 
Panel and the 3.8% found in the 1999 Fertility Survey (Zamora López 2006). Above 
and beyond this consideration, attention should be drawn to the limited degree of 
cohabitation in Spain (according to other sources: Meil 2003) and particularly to the 
fact that this is hardly an alternative to marriage. Indeed, the declining number of 
marriages has not been anywhere near compensated by an equivalent increase in the 
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number of consensual unions (Baizán et al. 2003). Nonetheless, while still relatively 
small, the number of consensual unions is characterized by moderate growth both in 
absolute terms and by its weight in the total. Finally, while cohabitation may serve the 
purpose of either trial marriage or an alternative to marriage in second unions, its 
incidence is small due to the scant number of second unions recorded in Spain (Meil 
2003).  
Legislation governing divorce, in turn, was enacted fairly recently in Spain (1981). 
The number of divorces grew nearly 2.8-fold between 1985 (just under 18,300) and 
2004, when close to 51,000 were recorded. Nonetheless, the total divorce rate only rose 
from 0.08 to 0.10 divorces per marriage in the same period, although it did climb 
somewhat higher in certain years (0.15 in 1995). These figures do not include 
separations, which are more numerous than divorces and also grew 3.3-fold between 
1985 (25,046) and 2004 (82,400). In this regard, the 1981 Divorce Act stipulated prior 
separation for a certain period of time – one year for legal separations and two for de 
facto separations – as a requisite to divorce (Alberdi 1999). Simply summing the 
number of separations and divorces would therefore yield inaccurate results, for some 
cases would logically be counted twice. As this requisite was removed in the new act 
passed in 2005, couples may now obtain a divorce with no need for prior separation, 
which, when legal, involves a court hearing. Under the former arrangements, couples 
were obliged to duplicate legal procedures.  
Since the statistics on the dissolution of marriage have unfortunately been very 
rudimentary in Spain, a detailed analysis of the phenomenon is no easy task. That 
notwithstanding, the average duration of marriage prior to divorce was observed to 
decline from 15.4 years in 1985 to 14.4 in 2001, inching back up to 14.7 in 2003. The 
lower figures recorded from the 1980s to 2001 are not necessarily due to greater 
vulnerability of unions, yet rather due to the fact that the enactment of the law (1981) 
had still been very recent in 1985, and to the concomitant accumulation of de facto 
separations from several years prior to that which could not be formalized as divorce 
until the law was enacted. Similarly, with the elimination of the mandatory ‘cooling-
off’ period between separation and divorce in the 2005 act, the duration of marriage 
among newly divorced couples may be expected to decrease by at least one or two 
years, i.e., the mandatory legal or de facto separation period, respectively, required 
under the former legislation. 
Exclusively civil marriage, involving no religious ceremony, has become more and 
more common in recent years, accounting for 19.3% of weddings in 1990 but 37% in 
2004. The increase might be explained, in part, by the parallel growth in the proportion 
of marriages involving divorced persons, which rose from 2.6% in 1990 to 7.2% in 
2004 for women and from 3.8% to 8% for men. However, these proportions are too 
small to fully explain the phenomenon, which would rather appear to be the expression 
Delgado et al.: Spain: Short on children and short on family policies  
1080 http://www.demographic-research.org 
of a shift away from religious practice within the broader process of gradual 
secularization of Spanish society. In this regard, a more precise indicator of such a shift 
away from religion would be the increase between 1990 and 2004 (from 14.3% to 
28.2%, respectively) in the proportion of civil first marriages, for this is indicative of a 
deliberate choice on the part of the spouses. Divorced Catholics, on the contrary, have 
no other choice open to them, inasmuch as they are unable to remarry in the church. 
Nonetheless, in light of the predominance of religious weddings in first marriages (over 
70%), religious indifference in this regard may be seen to be fairly moderate. 
 
 
4. Contraception  
While the first fertility transition took place before modern contraceptives were 
available and was based on more rudimentary and less effective practices (Santow 
1995; Van de Walle and Muhsam 1995; Van de Walle 2000), these methods, primarily 
oral contraceptives, played a crucial role in the second transition. Act 45/78, which 
decriminalized contraceptives in Spain with the amendment of articles 343 bis and 416 
of the Penal Code, entered into effect in 1978. This does not mean that prior to that date 
Spanish women did not use contraceptives, for such provisions were only leniently 
enforced and contraceptive methods could be obtained legally if prescribed for 
therapeutic purposes. Contraceptives were also often purchased abroad for personal or 
third party use. Nonetheless, such methods of sidestepping the law or attenuating its 
effects were only accessible to people with greater financial and educational resources 
and beyond the reach of a large portion of the population. Hence, the change in Spanish 
women’s contraceptive patterns has been gradual and the transformation, primarily with 
respect to the effectiveness of the methods used, has come relatively recently – in the 
1980s and 1990s. The proportion of women using contraception in general grew during 
that period, with the use of effective methods exhibiting the steepest rise.  
The figures obtained in three successive surveys and summarized in Table 4 are 
indicative of the trends in the use of contraception. These figures show the prevalence 
of contraception, i.e., the proportion of all women in marital or consensual unions using 
some manner of contraception, and the breakdown into irreversible and reversible 
methods, with the latter in turn divided into modern and traditional methods. 
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Table 4: Contraceptive status: Women aged 15-49 in a union (marriage or 
  consensual union), Spain 1985-1999 
 
a) ENCUESTA DE FECUNDIDAD 1999             
    Age group (at interview) 
  Total 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
    Birth cohort 
  Total 1979-83 1974-78 1969-73 1964-68 1959-63 1954-58 1949-53 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 71.6 59.1 71.8 71.2 78.4 75.1 74.7 56.5 
Sterilization 19.2 1.2 0.6 3.7 13.4 22.5 30.2 22.6 
Reversible methods 52.4 57.9 71.2 67.5 65.1 52.7 44.6 33.9 
Modern methods (1) 46.8 41.8 66.0 63.5 60.3 48.2 38.5 25.9 
Traditional methods 
(2) 5.6 16.1 5.2 4.0 4.8 4.5 6.1 8.0 
Using no 
contraceptive 
method 21.7 37.0 19.3 17.0 14.2 19.9 20.2 36.8 
(N) sample 7,749 630 953 1,148 1,400 1,371 1,229 1,018 
b) ENCUESTA DE FECUNDIDAD Y FAMILIA 1995 (FFS)           
    Age group (at interview) 
  Total 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
    Birth cohort 
  Total 1975-77 1970-75 1965-70 1960-65 1955-60 1950-55 1945-50 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 81.1 85.7 76.0 77.4 83.8 85.7 84.7 71.9 
Sterilization 20.2 0 1.2 4.6 14.8 28.6 31.6 27.7 
Reversible methods 60.9 85.7 74.8 72.8 69.0 57.1 53.1 44.2 
Modern methods (1) 47.3 64.1 67.3 66.4 60.4 43.6 34.7 19.8 
Traditional methods 
(2) 13.6 21.6 7.5 6.4 8.5 13.6 18.3 24.4 
Using no 
contraceptive 
method 8.0 7.1 11.5 8.7 7.2 6.0 4.8 13.4 
(N) sample 2,607 14 156 461 550 515 513 401 
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Table 4: continued 
 
c) ENCUESTA DE FECUNDIDAD 1985             
    Age group (at interview) 
  Total 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
    Birth cohort 
  Total 1965-67 1960-65 1945-50 1950-55 1945-50 1940-45 1935-40 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 59.8 44.8 64.5 65.2 69.1 64.5 56.1 37.5 
Sterilization 4.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.4 7.4 7.2 4.5 
Reversible 
methods 55.2 44.8 64.5 63.5 63.7 57.2 48.9 33.0 
Modern methods 
(1) 33.7 30.3 49.8 49.1 43.1 31.5 20.4 8.9 
Traditional 
methods (2) 21.5 14.5 14.7 14.5 20.6 25.7 28.5 24.1 
Using no 
contraceptive 
method 29.9 41.8 23.0 26.3 25.3 30.7 36.4 36.3 
(N) sample 8,782 664 1,739 1,415 1,306 1,323 1,198 1,137 
 
For Encuesta de Fecundidad 1999 the reference date is 1 January 1999 
(1) Pill, IUD, injection, diaphragm, condom. 
(2) Periodic abstinence, withdrawal, other methods. 
Source:  For 1999: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Fecundidad 1999.  
  For 1995: Delgado y Castro Martín (1998). 
  For 1985: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (1987) 
 
 
One of the most prominent differences between the first (1985) and last (1999) 
surveys is the substantial increase in the prevalence of contraception, from 59.8% to 
71.6%, respectively. This rise is found in all age groups, but the figure for the 
intermediate year 1995 is particularly striking, for it not only shows an increase with 
respect to 1985, yet it is likewise 9.5 points higher than in 1999. A closer look at the 
figures, however, shows that the apparent retreat in 1999 cannot be regarded as such or 
does not equally affect all items, for one point in the decline is due to the drop in 
sterilization and virtually all the rest is due to the decline in traditional methods. A 
simple calculation of the ratio between effective methods and total contraceptive use 
shows that the quotient was higher in 1999 than in 1995; i.e., while in relative terms 
there were fewer users, there was a gain in effectiveness. Hence, the downturn in 
contraceptive prevalence in Spain between 1995 and 1999 is primarily due to a decline 
in traditional methods. The potential users of such methods – generally short on 
rigorous planning practice – may have opted for a posteriori control in the form of 
induced abortion. This presumption is supported by the steep rise in the figures on 
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induced abortion recorded during the same period in which the use of traditional 
methods declined. 
Viewing the figures by age groups in greater detail shows that between 1985 and 
1995, the use of contraception rose in all groups due to the increase in sterilization, 
primarily in groups of women aged 35 and over, but also due to the more widespread 
use of effective reversible methods, although this was offset by the decline in the use of 
traditional methods. The only exceptions to this pattern were found among teenagers, 
whose use of traditional methods likewise rose, and to a minor degree, women between 
the ages of 45 and 49. 
While there was a clear overall drop in the use of contraception between 1995 and 
1999, it varied in detail from one group to another. In women over 30, for instance, 
while the percentage of users of modern methods rose, the prevalence rate fell. This can 
be attributed to the reduction in both sterilization – understandable in light of the rising 
mean age at first childbirth – and the percentage of women using traditional methods. In 
women under 30, the use of all manner of contraceptives declined, with a particularly 
sharp drop among women under 20. The ratio between the use of modern methods and 
total contraception shows that effectiveness fell in this group. It should be noted, 
however, that whereas in the 1999 survey, the under 20 ages that were covered ranged 
from 15- to 19-year-olds, in the earlier surveys only 18- and 19-year-olds were 
included. In any event, reduced contraceptive protection, particularly effective 
protection among ages under 30, is mirrored in the abortion figures.  
It may be concluded from an analysis of contraceptive patterns among Spanish 
women that the transition from traditional to modern contraceptive methods has taken 
place very recently in Spain. Large percentages of women born in the mid-20th century 
used traditional methods such as ‘coitus interruptus’, whose effectiveness is 
questionable. Modern methods, primarily condoms, only began to be used by a majority 
when the generations born after the mid-1960s reached a sexually active age. These 
cohorts were responsible for consolidating the contraceptive transition in Spain, and the 
substitution of modern contraceptives for traditional methods whose effectiveness is 
uncertain. 
 
 
5. Induced abortion  
While laws decriminalizing abortion in most European countries date from the 1970s, 
in Spain, decriminalization dates from 1985, when Article 417 bis of the Penal Code 
was amended. Nonetheless, abortion had been legalized relatively early, albeit briefly, 
in Spain, (during the Second Republic, from 1931 to 1934). The legislation presently in 
force allows abortion under three circumstances: a) when the woman’s physical or 
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mental health is in jeopardy; b) when the pregnancy is the result of a previously 
reported rape; and c) the foetus is diagnosed to have severe physical or mental defects. 
In cases ‘b’ and ‘c’, the abortion must be performed within the first 12 or 22 weeks of 
gestation, respectively. The law sets no limit for case ‘a’. 
Since decriminalization, the number of induced abortions in Spain has grown 
steadily. According to Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs data, it rose from 
37,000 in 1990 to nearly 85,000 in 2004, with an even steeper increase in the age 
groups under 25, particularly bearing in mind the declining population of that age in the 
interim (Delgado and Barrios 2007). The chief reason adduced for the procedure was 
concern for the mother’s physical or mental health, which accounted for over 90% of 
the cases, and for over 99% in women under 25. This provision, in fact, affords 
considerable leeway. 
The number of abortions continued to rise both when fertility fell and when it 
turned slightly upward and, while the age at first childbirth followed a clearly upward 
trend, the mean age at first abortion declined steeply (Figure 10), from 28.5 in 1990 to 
26.1 in 2004.  
 
Figure 10: Mean age at childbearing and at abortion, Spain, 1990-2004 
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One prominent finding is that the rate of recurrence grew in all age groups. In 
2001, 25% of all women aborting voluntarily had a second or higher-order abortion, up 
from 20% in 1991. The figure has continued to climb, according to the latest data 
(27.8% in 2004). This trend is more acute in certain age groups, such as women aged 
30-39, where the recurrence rate rose from 25% in 1990 to 34% in 2004. Around 11% 
of all teenage abortions, in turn, are second time interruptions.  
The figures on induced abortion acquire significance only if contrasted with the 
figures on births, either as a proportion of the latter or expressing the number of induced 
abortions as a percentage of the total number of pregnancies. Table 5 gives these figures 
by age groups in three different years: 1991, at the beginning of the period when 
exhaustive data on induced abortion first became available; 1995, when the proportion 
of pregnancies ending in abortion had not yet begun to decline in any age group; and 
2004, the last year for which data are available.  
 
Table 5: Abortion ratio*, Spain, 1991-2004 
 
AGE  GROUP 1991 1995 2000 2004 
15-19 22.2 35.9 44.1 47.8 
20-24 12.9 21.9 30.0 32.9 
25-29 5.4 7.7 10.5 14.5 
30-34 6.0 6.3 6.3 7.6 
35-39 13.0 12.5 9.9 10.2 
40-44 25.2 29.3 23.2 21.4 
45-49 35.6 48.1 38.3 33.1 
TOTAL 15-49 9.0 11.6 13.2 15.3 
Total Induced Abortion Rate 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.27 
TOTAL ABORTIONS** 41,910 49,578 63,756 84,985 
 
*Proportion of abortions (six months before) on pregnancies 
**Calendar year 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo. 
 
 
Two sub-periods must be defined to analyze developments in the 1990s: from 
1991 to 1995, and from the latter year through 2004. Between 1991 and 1995, the 
proportion of pregnancies ending in abortion rose in all the age groups without 
exception. Be it said, however, that while for women under 25 and over 45 the 
percentages rose between 9 and 14 points, for women in the intermediate groups they 
increased much more moderately. Between 1995 and 2004, the proportion of abortions 
climbed in all age groups under 35, but most strikingly among young women from 20 
to 24 as well as teenagers, among whom it rose by between 11 and 12 points. This 
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brought the proportion of interrupted pregnancies among teenagers to 47.8% and among 
women from 20 to 24 to 32.9% in 2004. Only the figure for women from 45 to 49 came 
close to those percentages. But one of the most prominent traits of the period analyzed 
is the uninterrupted rise in the total induced abortion rate, which was very moderate 
between 1991 and 1995 and steeper thereafter. 
Perhaps the chief inference to be drawn is that the tendency of the youngest and 
oldest women to resort to abortion when faced with an unwanted pregnancy is an 
indication of a considerable paucity of contraceptive resources in these age groups. 
Among the younger women, this may be regarded as a consequence of shortcomings in 
sex education, for these subjects are not included in school curricula. Not only 
information, but education is needed, consisting of instilling in young adults the 
awareness of the risk of pregnancy inherent in sexual intercourse without appropriate 
contraceptive protection. 
Here again, attention must be drawn to the impact of the foreign population. While 
exhaustive information on induced abortion by nationality is not always available, 
where it is, foreign women are found to be contributing substantially to the increase in 
the abortion numbers: in the region of Madrid, of the total induced abortions performed 
in 2004, foreign women comprised 52%. The percentage was even higher in the 20-34 
age groups, reaching 58% in some cases (López-Gay and Izarra Pérez 2005). These 
data can obviously not be extrapolated to Spain as a whole, because, among other 
reasons, the foreign population is not as large in other communities as it is in Madrid. 
And yet, figures from other regions are indicative of a similar pattern, i.e., that foreign 
women in Spain are contributing much more in relative terms to the number of 
abortions than to the number of births.  
 
 
6. Societal conditions impacting on family formation  
Profound cultural, social, and economic change has raised the perceived cost of both 
leaving the parental home, with the formation of a marital or consensual union, and 
parenthood. This is the underlying reason for the decline in fertility to rates far below 
generation replacement levels. On the one hand, the greater freedom of movement 
enjoyed by adult children as a result of quasi-democratic relationships with their parents 
(i.e., the emergence of the so-called “negotiating family”) (Meil 2006a), and growing 
household welfare, along with the social differentiation between sexuality and 
procreation, have weakened the pressures for leaving the parental home at an early age. 
On the other hand, the generalized use of family planning has lightened social pressures 
to form a family, at the same time that the demands on potential parents have grown 
due to a more exacting definition of responsible parenthood, raising the perceived cost 
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of having children even higher. The increasing dualization of the labor-market has 
made the careers of the youngest generations and women more unstable, particularly in 
the years when families are formed, while aspirations for higher levels of material well-
being have made two incomes necessary to guarantee the wherewithal to acquire 
socially desirable levels of consumer goods. Both processes, together with the difficulty 
in reaching a balance between work and family life, again in a context of family 
planning, have also contributed to raising the perceived cost of having children. The 
lack of any explicit family policy and transfers to offset such costs has reinforced that 
perception. A more detailed discussion of this issue follows. 
 
 
a) Cultural change and the social perception of the costs of parenthood  
Like other developed countries in the period covered by this analysis, Spain has 
seen profound change in the values and norms that shape individual life projects. As 
Second Demographic Transition theorists (Lesthaeghe 1983; Van de Kàa 1987) and 
Ulrich Beck’s (1992) Individualization Theory sustains, the last quarter century – which 
in Spain, moreover, concurred with the transition from dictatorship to democracy – has 
witnessed a profound change in the social control exerted on individuals, giving rise to 
greater freedom in the design of individual life projects. Family projects and lifestyles, 
in particular, have been privatized while inherited models of family organization have 
ceased to be binding; the forms that family life eventually adopts have thus come to 
depend on the negotiation conducted by the parties concerned. 
This process is often believed to be less widely extended in southern European 
countries, such as Spain, than in northern European and English-speaking countries 
(McDonald 2002). The fact that certain indicators of family change – cohabitation, 
divorce or female employment – do not reach levels comparable to the ones prevailing 
in other countries does not, however, imply that the scope of cultural change has been 
smaller, as this paper will contend. Although cultural change embraces many 
dimensions, for reasons of space, this discussion will be restricted to change relating to 
religious practice, gender role models, the various dimensions of parenthood, and the 
perception of the conditions requisite to forming a family. 
Firstly, the change in the religious dimension of life: while during General 
Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975) Catholicism was the official state religion and the 
Church wielded enormous social power and influence, the 1960s brought an 
intensification of the separation between religion and state, undermining the church’s 
influence in society.  Its predominance waned even more swiftly with the transition to 
democracy, not only in the wake of the development of an open and plural society, but 
also due to its loss of credibility for its close association with the dictatorship. Any 
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number of indicators may be cited in this regard, but one of the most obvious is church 
attendance, which has consistently declined. According to the ISSP’s survey on religion 
(1998), a mere 30% of the population regularly attended religious services (at least 
several times a month) in that year, while the figure for young adults – (18 to 29 years 
old) – was only 13%. Subsequent trends do not appear to be indicative of any 
substantial rise in religious practice, reflecting the ebbing influence of religion in 
society as a whole; and family life in particular. The approval of homosexual marriage 
in 2005, including adoption rights, with little social conflict outside of a few critical 
demonstrations, certified that loss of influence. In a context of low fertility, however, 
this should not be construed to mean that women claiming to be Catholic do not have 
higher fertility than non-Catholics (Adsera 2004).  
In connection with changing gender role models, in the mid-1970s when the steep 
decline in fertility began, the breadwinner family model clearly prevailed – even among 
most young adults and particularly males (de Pablo 1976). Today, however, both 
female and male employment is regarded to be indispensable for family well-being as it 
is for women’s independence. In fact, agreement with statements such as “both should 
contribute to the household income” is more common (88%) in Spain than in English-
speaking countries such as the United Kingdom (59%) and comparable to findings for 
Nordic countries such as Sweden (83%), while agreement with the statement ‘a man’s 
job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family’ is only 
moderately more widespread than in those countries (25% compared to 20% and 8%, 
respectively), and sustained mainly by older people (ISSP 2002). The socially 
predominant family model for the younger generations, but also for their parents and 
many of the older generations, is therefore the two-earner family. Nonetheless, as in all 
other developed countries, despite this profound redefinition of gender role models, 
women’s employment is still not seen in the same light as men’s.  And yet, the Spanish 
working-age population does not consider itself to be very family-focused; in fact, the 
percentage of those who feel that women should not work when they have pre-school 
children is fairly low, as Table 6 shows.  In terms of social representation, therefore, 
childbearing is not broadly perceived as incompatible with paid work, or at least not 
more than in other countries with higher levels of fertility (Meil 2006b). 
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Table 6: Attitudes towards mother’s paid work: Responses to the question:
  “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-
  time, part time or not at all under the following circumstances?” 
  Respondents aged 18-60 
 
  SWEDEN 
  Full- time Part-time Stay home 
After marrying and before there are children 96 4 0 
When there is a child under school age 17 68 15 
After the youngest child starts school 39 60 2 
After the children leave home 93 7 0 
 SPAIN 
After marrying and before there are children 80 16 4 
When there is a child under school age 21 48 31 
After the youngest child starts school 42 47 11 
After the children leave home 78 14 8 
  UNITED KINGDOM 
After marrying and before there are children 93 5 1 
When there is a child under school age 5 43 52 
After the youngest child starts school 20 75 5 
After the children leave home 79 20 1 
 
Source:  International Social Survey Programme, Family and Changing Gender Roles III, 2002 in Zentral Archiv der Empirischen 
 Forschung, Universität Köln, ZA Study 3880 
 
 
Another obvious dimension of cultural change, which nevertheless merits 
attention, is the social perception of different essential aspects of family formation. In 
this regard, social differentiation between sexuality and procreation has emerged, 
family planning has become standard practice and there is no longer any stigma 
attached to being unmarried or childless. These cultural changes have weakened the 
pressures in favor of parenthood, although they have not detracted from the appeal of 
forming a stable relationship and a family, either in Spain (Meil 2004b) or other 
advanced countries (World Values Survey 1999, Busch and Scholz 2006). Despite the 
reduction in the number of children wanted, as discussed above, few individuals and 
couples claim their ideal to be no children at all; rather, when this is the case, it is a 
matter of the timing not being right until it is too late, rather than a decision consciously 
pursued from the outset (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995). In a context of controlled 
fertility, however, the requisites for parenthood have become more and more exacting. 
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There is a general perception among parents that it is harder to raise children today than 
it was in the past (Meil 2006a). 
Such stricter prerequisites for parenthood stem from the expansion of consumer 
society and the cultural change on which it rests, but they are also the outcome of a 
profound transformation in intergenerational relations within today’s families. The new 
circumstances have enabled youngsters to postpone leaving home and forming unions, 
with the concomitant decline in fertility (Kohler et al. 2002, Delgado et al., 2006). The 
greater freedom enjoyed by young adults in their parents’ homes as a result of the 
disappearance of the authoritarian and the emergence of the ‘negotiating’ family, has 
meant that young adults no longer equate living with their parents with dependence. In 
addition to children’s attainment of autonomy at younger and younger ages, families’ 
improved income has afforded youngsters greater spending power. Indeed, children are 
given a weekly or monthly allowance and, when working, are no longer expected (or 
required) to add their wages to the family income. The resulting rise in the cost of 
leaving the parental home without substantially forfeiting comfort levels has led to the 
postponement to older and older ages of marital or consensual partnering (Baizán et al. 
2002). The most relevant of these costs, in Spain, include access to home ownership 
prior to cohabitation or marriage and, very closely related to this issue, job security 
(López 2005). Purchase of a home has come to be perceived as a requisite to 
emancipation for the vast majority of young adults, since paying rent is viewed as a 
waste of money. The spectacular rise in housing prices in the last ten years – when 
market prices have climbed 2.5-fold – has reinforced this perception and rendered home 
ownership the more desirable and even more difficult. In this context, reference should 
be made both to the rise in the perceived costs of parenthood and the extension of risk-
averse behavior, reinforced by labor-market dualization. 
 
 
b) Socio-structural factors  
Heightened demands for emancipation from the parental home and for parenthood 
have concurred with a less favorable labor-market, growing unemployment rates and 
the emergence of increasingly unstable careers, which have in turn generated the need 
to invest more time in education. After the 1973 crisis, unemployment began to be a 
social problem of prime importance, particularly for the younger generations and 
women, more and more of whom began to seek paid work. Despite the fact that, as 
Figure 11 shows, youth and female unemployment fluctuates with the business cycle, 
unemployment is systematically perceived as a primary social problem and the primary 
personal problem among young adults.  
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Figure 11: Unemployment rates for males (m) and females (f) by age groups, 
Spain, 1987-2006 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
 
 
Not only are the expectations of successive generations of young people marked 
by unemployment and long job-seeking periods, but career instability has become a 
common experience (Figure 12) as well. The employment policy designed after the 
mid-1980s to promote youth and female employment has led to the dualization of the 
labor-market, with one set of workers with steady, well-secured jobs and a second 
group, mostly comprising of young adults and women, with temporary jobs, insufficient 
social protection, high turnover rates and more or less lengthy periods of 
unemployment. These uncertainties have contributed decisively to the delay in the 
formation of partnerships and parenthood  (Simó et al. 2005). While this pattern is 
common to all developed countries, the temporary employment rates in Spain have 
been much higher than in other EU countries (around 33% in the last ten years as 
compared to a community average of 13%), affecting not only a high proportion of 
youngsters but also generations in parenthood age. With cyclical employment recovery 
failing to lead to any substantial reduction in temporary employment rates, job 
instability has become a basic structural feature affecting young men and women both 
Delgado et al.: Spain: Short on children and short on family policies  
1092 http://www.demographic-research.org 
throughout the entire period of family formation, when mortgages have to be paid and 
decisions on fertility need to be made. 
 
Figure 12: Percentage of employed people with unstable labor conditions by 
age, Spain, 1987-2004 
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This labor-market dualization has a decisive effect on the balance between work 
and family life, while job insecurity, employers’ general insensitivity toward these sorts 
of problems – not unlike their counterparts in other European countries (Evans 2001) – 
long working hours (mean 41-hour working weeks for full-time employees) and the 
general rejection of part-time work (because of the low pay) have made that balance 
even more difficult. The existence of a gender gap between women’s access to paid 
work and the distribution of domestic chores, along with labor-market discrimination 
against mothers, have been cited as two of the primary reasons for the decline in 
fertility (Chesnais 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999; McDonald 2000). Although gender 
equality on the labor-market and in the family is still nowhere near a reality, important 
changes in recent decades have tended to lower the level of discrimination and 
inequality. The presence on the labor-market of women aged 25 to 49 with children 
under 15 came, in 2004, to 59% for those with one child, 53% for those with two and 
43% for those with three or more children (Eurostat 2004). At the same time, male 
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involvement in child-rearing and domestic chores has also increased considerably 
(Alberdi 2003; García Díez 2004; Meil 2006b). According to time use surveys (Meil 
2006b), in 23% of dual-earner households the division of housework between the 
spouses (excepting childcare) is roughly egalitarian; and according to women’s 
responses in opinion surveys, that figure may be as high as 36% (Meil 2006a). 
Nonetheless, this has not translated into any perceptible increase in fertility. 
The absence of any explicit family policy and the very low tax benefits for families 
have reinforced the perception of the high cost of parenthood. The changes forthcoming 
in the last ten years have constituted more of a political gesture than genuine measures, 
as discussed below, and have not therefore substantially modified the general 
perception that having a child in Spain is costly, in terms of direct as well as indirect 
and opportunity costs. 
 
 
7. Family policies supporting childbearing  
Family policy played a prominent political and social role during the Franco 
dictatorship (1936-1975) (Meil 1994). Family policy translated, on the one hand, into 
very restrictive legal provisions to reinforce traditional family relationships and, on the 
other hand, a relatively generous policy of income transfers designed to keep women at 
home, caring for their families, as well as to raise birth rates (del Campo 1995; Meil and 
Iglesias de Ussel 2001). In parallel, a pension policy providing for nearly universal 
coverage was developed, although the tiny sums involved forced the elderly to rely on 
their own savings or intergenerational solidarity. With the transition to democracy, 
against the backdrop of the profound change taking place in social structures – not only 
in gender roles, but also in lifestyles and the model for economic growth– social policy 
priorities were radically redesigned. Providing decent and sufficient pensions and 
thereby ensuring financial independence for each generation became a priority 
objective, together with the development – in light of the rapid rise in unemployment 
rates – of social protection for the unemployed, particularly for workers with 
dependants. The pursuit of this objective left a very narrow margin for the development 
of other social welfare policies, particularly family policies, which, moreover, were 
deeply discredited, for they were associated with social protection for the traditional 
family. As a result of this process, social protection for the family plunged to 
insignificant levels (Meil 1994; Iglesias de Ussel 1998; Picontó-Novales 1997; Meil 
and Iglesias de Ussel 2001; López  and Valiño 2004).  
Although income transfers were broadly reformed in 1990, they were primarily 
geared to low income families or families with disabled children. These transfers were 
never intended to substantially improve families’ income levels, for the sums involved 
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were and continue to be very small, so as not to increase public spending. Significantly, 
they have only been inflation-adjusted once since they were instituted, and therefore 
their purchasing power and the protection they afford have systematically declined. 
While in the last 20 years the percentage of public spending earmarked for family 
benefits doubled from 0.3% to 0.6% of the GDP, it is still much lower than the 
European  (EU-25) average, which was 2.1% in 2003 and rising (Eurostat 2006). There 
has never actually been political determination or organized social demand that has 
been able to exert enough pressure to establish a system of income redistribution that 
would compensate families for part of the costs of raising children, either through direct 
Social Security benefits or income tax relief. Such costs have been privatized under the 
implicit assumption that they are an issue that should be dealt with by families 
themselves. There appears to be a general consensus in this respect, even though 
population surveys show (depending on the wording of the questions) that a majority 
favors financial benefits for families. The tax treatment of dependants illustrates this 
quite clearly: in 2000, an average salary provided an after-tax disposable income, net of 
family transfers, of 85% for singles and 95% for a person with two children and a 
spouse with no paid work (Meil and Iglesias de Ussel 2001). Despite the fact that in the 
context of the plunge in fertility, the major political and social actors have begun to 
express the need for an active family policy and certain measures have been taken in 
this regard (birth, multiple birth or large family allowances). A review of the national 
budget reveals that the costs of having children or caring for dependant family members 
continue to be defrayed nearly exclusively by families (Meil 2004a). Yet, as a recent 
opinion poll shows (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2004), what Spanish public 
opinion and social as well as political actors associate with family support policies are 
housing policies and measures (easier access to ownership) as well as labor-market (less 
temporary employment) and old-age (more public support for the elderly) policies and 
measures to promote the balance between family and working lives. Policies addressing 
such demands have been developed in recent years or are being designed (Meil 2006b), 
although in this context only the last item mentioned is briefly discussed below.  
As income transfers to cover family needs have waned, non-discrimination for 
reasons of sex and equal opportunities for women and men have emerged as priority 
targets of public policy, materializing, among other things, in the furtherance of female 
employment and the balance between work and family life. A comprehensive act on 
equality between men and women was approved in 2007. One of the measures for 
furthering the work/family balance that has been gradually introduced is the expansion 
of leaves to up to three years with increasingly greater guarantees for returning to work, 
although the costs of this decision are absorbed almost exclusively by families (or more 
precisely, women); the age of first enrolment in school, in turn, has been lowered to 
three years of age. In another vein, sensitization campaigns have been intensified as of 
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late, both to foster greater father involvement in the family domain and to encourage 
employers to establish working conditions more clearly geared to facilitating the 
balance between work and family life. 
The general characteristics and evolution of the measures of leaves can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
• Successive enlargement of maternity leave to 16 weeks (1989), expanded to 18 
weeks in the event of babies with disabilities (2007). In 1995, maternity was 
included as a specific Social Security contingency, distinguished from the 
temporary inability to work, with a 100% compensation salary and more flexible 
conditions (to cover adopted and foster children as well). A maternity allowance 
for self-employed workers was introduced in 2006, and entitlement conditions for 
young mothers were further lowered in 2007. 
• Introduction of fathers’ right to also take up to four weeks of maternity leave 
(1989) and beginning in 2007 a specific 13-day paternity leave (15 in the event of 
multiple births and four weeks for all after 2013), in addition to the two days 
legislated since 1980. 
• Successive expansion of parental-leave to up to three years (1980), to include not 
only biological children, but adopted and foster children as well (1989). Beginning 
in 1999, workers have also been entitled to a one-year leave (two years after 2007) 
to care for family members up to the second degree of kinship who for reasons of 
age or illness are unable to manage on their own and who have no paid 
employment. Although no allowance is paid to compensate for the forfeiture of 
their salaries, employees are allowed to compute their social security tax as paid 
during the first year of parental-leave.  
• Enhancement of return to work guarantees in the event of parental-leave with the 
establishment in 1989 of the right to reserve a job for the first year of leave and, in 
1995, the employment relationship for up to three years; prohibition of dismissal 
for maternity after 1999.  
• Beginning in 1999, the costs of leaves were lowered for employers, who were 
exempted from social security tax for employment contracts (under temporary 
arrangements) to replace workers on leave to care for minors, and since 2002, for 
workers on leave to care for relatives up to the second degree of kinship.  
• Since 1980 employees have also been entitled to cut back their working hours from 
1/3 to 1/2 (since 2007 from 1/8 to 1/2), with a proportional cut in their salaries (and 
attendant welfare) to care for children under the age of six (eight after 2007) or 
persons with a physical, mental or sensorial handicap who do not work in the paid 
economy. Since 2001 workers with hospitalized or premature children may also 
reduce their working week by a maximum of two hours, with a proportional 
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reduction in salary. Since 1999, such cutbacks have also been possible in order to 
care for family members up to the second degree of kinship who are unable to take 
care of themselves due to age or illness. 
• The introduction in 2003 of an allowance of up to 1,200 euros yearly for children 
under the age of three is only granted to mothers who work and pay social security 
tax, but not to those who are on leave or have no paid work. 
 
This leave policy has been supplemented by the provision, included in the 1990 
education reform, that lowered the school age to three years, even though the reasons 
behind this measure have less to do with a policy to further balanced work and family 
life than with education policy per se. The outcome has been the universal schooling of 
children between the ages of three and six in all-day schools, most of them with midday 
meal services: the enrolment rate of three-year-olds grew from 57% to 97% between 
1994 and 2005, and has now reached 100% for four-year-olds. Such schooling was 
cost-free in public schools only until 2003 (65% of all places are in public schools), but 
in charter schools as well after that year. Care for children under age three, however, 
takes place primarily in informal contexts (family or baby-sitters), for the schooling rate 
for these ages in 2005 was only 13.5% (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia 2005), with 
the vast majority in private institutions.  
The policy for balancing work and family life in Spain has consisted, therefore, in 
providing time to assume family responsibilities while also attempting to guarantee the 
employment relationship. This has been done essentially through legislation and by 
providing incentives for employers, while the costs of child-rearing have been 
shouldered nearly exclusively by families. The idea that having and rearing children is 
beneficial for society and that such costs must be partially offset has not come to form a 
part of the conceits addressed on the political arena; it should consequently come as no 
surprise that the population at large perceives that there is no financial aid for raising 
children, which has become a very expensive endeavor. 
 
 
8. Prospects and conclusions  
The consequences of the present Spanish fertility levels, while varied in nature – 
demographic, economic, political and so on – are not specific to Spain, but shared with 
other countries with similar levels. One of the most prominent results relates to 
population aging. 
The data in Table 7 highlight the profound change that took place in the age 
structure of the Spanish population between 1950 and 2001; a change that will continue 
to intensify over the next half century. Whereas the weight of the youngest portion of 
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the population (0-19) declined from 35.8% in 1950 to 20.5% in 2001, the weight of the 
most elderly (65 and over) grew from 7.2% to 17.0%. In absolute numbers, however, 
the drop in the former (-1.63 million) was much smaller than the rise (+4.94 million) in 
the latter. It is interesting to note that in the same period, the potential working 
population (20-64) grew both in relative (from 56.9% to 62.4%) and absolute (+9.56 
million) terms. This would mitigate, at least for the period in question, the adverse 
consequences of the growing numbers of old aged people. Moreover, there has been a 
decline in the proportion of youngsters and children in the total dependent population 
supported by the working population. 
 
Table 7: Age structure of the Spanish population 1950, 2001, 2060 
 
POPULATION         
Year Total 0-19 20-64 65+ 80+ 
            
1950 27.976,755 10.026,544 15.926,706 2.023,505 272,617 
2001 40.847,371 8.397,421 25.485,683 6.964,267 1.584,780 
2060 52.511,518 9.297,946 27.533,694 15.679,878 6.891,590 
DISTRIBUTION (%)         
Year Total 0-19 20-64 65+ 80+ 
1950 100.0 35.8 56.9 7.2 1.0 
2001 100.0 20.5 62.4 17.0 3.9 
2060 100.0 17.7 52.4 29.9 13.1 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística in www.ine.es/inebase/cgi and own elaboration  
 
Projections formulated by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2006b) confirm 
the aging of the Spanish population irrespective of the variant used. Not only will 
persons over age 65 account for nearly 30% of the population in 2060, but their actual 
numbers will grow to 16 million by that year, up by 8.72 million since 2001. Moreover, 
in the same time frame the increase in the number of people aged over 80 (+5.31 
million) will exceed the growth of the young and potential working population together 
(+0.90 and +2.05 million, respectively). As a result, the over 80s will come to 7 million 
or 13.1% of the total population by 2060. Such explosive growth in the number of very 
old people will certainly have a forceful impact on Spanish society.  
From 1950 to 2060, then, the absolute increase in the number of people over 65 
will be 13.66 million, i.e., greater than the rise in the potential working population 
(11.61 million during the same period). And yet, the population actually supporting the 
dependent population, that is to say, the taxpaying workforce rather than the potential 
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working population, may in fact grow faster than the dependent segment of young and 
old citizens. This quasi-conviction is based on the increasing participation of women in 
the labor market and increased employment rates associated with the arrival of 
immigrants, developments observed in recent years that will in all likelihood continue 
to be seen in the years to come. An increase in the female working population might 
well go hand-in-hand with certain perverse effects, for in the absence of measures to 
balance work and family life, greater female participation in the labor-market might 
have an adverse effect on fertility. Add to this – in the not so distant future – a 
postponement in the retirement age; a measure that is receiving increasingly greater 
political and media coverage and that a substantial portion of the population is 
beginning to view as inevitable.  
While aging is the most important consequence of the demographic trends 
observed to date and foreseeable through horizon year 2060, another repercussion may 
be the imbalance of the marriage market, closely linked to the base of the pyramid; this 
effect may nonetheless be countered, in Spain, by a growing foreign population, 
favoring the number of mixed marriages and births in which at least one of the parents 
is Spanish. It is believed that such a development would enhance and accelerate the 
integration of the foreign population in Spain. 
Another factor of a somewhat different nature might be the rise in the financial – 
and perhaps also the psychological – value of children in a framework of increasingly 
scarce births. At the same time, the reduction in the number or the total absence of 
children, along with the potential prolongation of a couple’s life expectancy may lead to 
more fragile relationships, although these effects have not yet been perceived. 
Lastly, one aspect directly related to the postponement of childbearing and 
subsequent reconsideration is the already visible increase in the use of assisted 
reproduction techniques. Since such treatments are not presently covered by the public 
health system, the couples concerned are burdened not only with the emotional, but also 
the considerable financial costs involved.  
The trends in the proximate determinants analyzed – nuptiality, contraception, and 
induced abortion – had an adverse effect on fertility rates in the mid-1990s, and there is 
no clear evidence at this time in support of the possibility of reversing the trend. But 
social determinants are what affect fertility most directly, while also acting on the 
proximate determinants and thereby conditioning the resulting levels even more 
intensely. Bearing in mind the social factors involved –whether in their political, 
economic, cultural, legal or biological dimension – a return in Spain to significantly 
higher levels does not appear to be likely in the short term. The arguments underpinning 
these assertions are as follows: 
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• Spain’s fertility rate is determined by the drastic reduction in higher than second-
order children, which, in turn, is primarily the result of the late age at first 
motherhood. 
• The postponement of first motherhood is associated with the late age at first 
marriage/cohabitation, which is somewhat higher in marriage than in consensual 
unions. 
• Late marriage/cohabitation is conditioned by young adults’ perception of their 
ability to achieve financial independence. In this regard, the structural factors 
afflicting the Spanish labor-market are decisive: in the 1990s the unemployment 
rates among people under 30, particularly women, were conspicuously higher than 
the EU-15 average. Unemployment rates fell in the early years of this century, 
although in exchange for a rise in precarious employment and high temporary 
employment rates. Here again, young workers in general and women in particular 
were most acutely affected.  
• The price of housing climbed spectacularly throughout the 1990s and although the 
pace has slowed somewhat in the past year, the tendency is still upward. The 
situation is so serious that the economic authorities have been sounding alarms 
about the high levels of family indebtedness. 
 
People can hardly be blamed for wanting to have a job and a place to live before 
forming a family; and especially before having children. When uncertainties of this 
nature arise, the decision is to postpone the decision, which may lead to never making 
it. It is here that public policy should take the initiative if fertility dynamics are to be 
reversed in Spain.  
Therefore, one of the most important ways to attain any significant recovery of 
fertility rates is to lower the age at first childbirth. Public policies favoring a reversal in 
the trend to delay the age at first birth (support for young adults to purchase or rent 
housing, measures to facilitate access to a first job, lowering job insecurity and so on) 
or of support for motherhood (longer maternity leave for both parents, the institution of 
child care centers, aid for single mothers, measures geared to balancing women’s 
professional and family life, and so on) have either not been explicitly established in 
Spain or are insufficiently generous, despite certain very recent initiatives. There is, 
therefore, no indication that any clear turnabout is in the offing. One solution put 
forward on occasion, to the effect that fertility should increase with foreign 
immigration, must be ruled out, for it entails assuming wholly implausible fertility rates 
among foreign women. 
Lutz and Skirbekk (2005) also identify a reduction in the age at childbirth as a key 
to recovering fertility in countries with values below what is regarded to be the critical 
total fertility rate (1.5). One of the measures these authors find to be most effective is a 
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cutback in the number of years devoted to education. This strategy may indisputably be 
effective, but it would be insufficient in Spain. In this country, the presence of other 
unfavorable circumstances as described above – labor- market structure, housing and so 
on – also tend to delay the initiation of adult life. Rather, a whole series of coordinated 
measures are required to lower the age at first childbirth if a clear and sustained upturn 
in fertility is to be feasible. 
But what Spanish society needs most is enhanced awareness of the nature of 
reproduction as an element of social balance in which all its members – public 
authorities, employers, individuals – are implicated and whose cost should not be borne 
exclusively by families, and certainly not solely by women who decide to be mothers.  
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